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Reviving the Voting Rights Act Post-Shelby
County: A New Standard for Vote Denial and
Voter ID Law Analysis Under Section Two
by

ELIZABETH CERMAK*

Introduction
The concept of the right to vote is fundamentally embedded within the
notion of a democratic system of government. Democracy, "rule of the
people," exists when citizens exercise power directly or elect representatives
from among themselves to form a governing body. In American democracy,
the ideal is to create a "government of the people, by the people, for the
people."' While America is often known around the world as a "shining city
on a hill" 2 for individual freedoms and representative government, the
guaranteed right to vote has remained unclear since the drafting of our
nation's Constitution.
While "we the people" is present in all foundational texts, the right to
vote is not treated as a fundamental right in the U.S. Constitution.3 The
original Constitution provided for only one branch of government, the House
of Representatives, to be popularly elected.4 Citizen voting was delegated to
the states, which were granted the power to determine the "times, places and
manner of holding elections."' This transfer of power allowed early states
to adopt numerous and varied voting requirements such as property

* J.D. Candidate 2018, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863).
2. See Ronald Reagan, Farewell Address (Jan. 11, 1989).
3. See Harperv. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (stating that "the right
to vote in state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned," however, for the first time holding that
"once the franchise granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
4. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, amended by U.S. CONST.
AMEND. XVII andU.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
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ownership, proof of paying taxes, and religious tests. By 1807, all but five
states had chosen to limit the franchise to white men exclusively. The
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870 guaranteed that "race, color,
or previous condition of servitude" could no longer serve as a basis for
denying the right to vote, but states nonetheless still had the power to
promulgate countless requirements designed to circumvent this prohibition.8
Aside from the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, there was
little effective federal intervention regarding the right to vote until after
World War II. 9 While there had been some attempts to remedy the
disenfranchisement experienced by African Americans, it wasn't until 1965
that Congress acted on its power to make or alter State election regulations
by passing the Voting Rights Act ("VRA").' 0 Decisively inserting federal
power into election regulation, the VRA outlawed literacy tests, authorized
federal examiners to enroll voters, and, under section 5 of the Act, required
"covered jurisdictions"-identified by their historic use of "now illegal tests
plus low voter turnout" by a formula contained in section 4(b)"-to obtain
federal "preclearance" before they could change electoral rules and
procedures.1 2 These additional protections against discriminatory state
election regulations immediately contributed to a substantial increase in
African-American voting. 13
The VRA was an undeniable success in this regard. In 1965, the gap in
voter registration between white and African American residents of the six

6.
(2002).

See Richard Briffault, The Contested Right to Vote, 100 MICH. L. REV. 6, 1510-12

7. See Briffault, supra note 6.
8. Poll taxes, cumulative poll taxes, literacy tests, lengthy residence requirements, elaborate
registration systems, and disfranchisement due to conviction of several petty crimes are among
some examples. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 1515.
9. The Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in 1920, granted American women the right to vote.
See Briffault, supra note 6, at 1520.
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (".. but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations. . . .")
11. The formula in § 4(b) currently provides that States or political subdivisions of a State
would be subject to the § 5 preclearance requirement if it had both: (1) a "test or device" restricting
the opportunity to register and vote in November of 1972 and (2) either less than 50% of persons
of voting age registered to vote or less than 50% voter turnout in the 1972 election. See Voting
Rights Act of 1965 § 4(b) (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b) (2017)).
12.
13.

See Briffault, supra note 6, at 1520.
Briffault, supra note 6, at 1521.
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states originally covered by section 5 ranged from 22.8% to 63.2%. 14 By
2004, this gap had closed to -3.8% (meaning there was a higher percentage
of African-Americans registered to vote than whites in some states) to
10.8%. In the 2004 election, African-American voter turnout actually
"exceeded white voter turnout in five of the [original] six states.""
In Shelby County v. Holder, Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged these
facts by stating there was "no doubt" the "remarkable" improvements in
African-American voter registration and turnout were "in large part because
of the Voting Rights Act." '6 However, it was also precisely due to these
improvements that the Shelby court ultimately concluded that the section
4(b) formula had become an unconstitutional extension of federal power.
Citing the data mentioned above, Roberts felt troubled that the coverage
formula had not been adjusted to recognize "today's statistics." 8 With an
unusual judicial chastisement of Congressional inaction, the majority opinion
found that Congress' failure to update the formula left them "with no choice but
to declare section 4(b) unconstitutional." 9 While the rest of the VRA was left
intact, the formula that had given life to section 5 could no longer be used as a
basis for subjecting jurisdictions to its preclearance requirements.
The three years between the Shelby decision and the 2016 presidential
election demonstrated the dramatic impact of freeing states from section 5's
preclearance provision. Between 2013 and Election Day 2016, states across
the country were able to pass or update a wide variety of election laws with
far less accountability than they had been subject to in the pre-Shelby era.20
Some of the most controversial election laws passed, updated, or tightened
during the post-Shelby time are commonly known as "voter ID" laws, and
require voters to present some form of identification before they cast a ballot.
Voter ID laws generally require voters to attain a government-issued ID, at

14. See S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 11 (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 12 (2006). For
example, in 1965, 69.9% of white residents of Mississippi were registered to vote compared to only
6.7% of African Americans, creating a gap of 63.2%.
15.
Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2626 (2013) (citing DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CENSUS
BUREAU, REPORTED VOTING AND REGISTRATION, BY SEX, RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN, FOR
STATES (Table 4b)).

16. Id.
17. Id. at 2631.
18. See id. at 2630-31.
19. Id. at 2631.
20. See, e.g., Tomas Lopez, 'Shelby County': One Year Later, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(June 24, 2014), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/shelby-county-one-year-later; Election
2016: Restrictive Voting Laws by the Numbers, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 28, 2016),
http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/election-2016-restrictive-voting-laws-numbers.
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their own cost, as a precondition to accessing the ballot. As anyone who has
been to the DMV or passport office has experienced, getting an ID card can
be time consuming, creating a special hardship for the elderly, disabled, and
working poor. These laws were immediately recognized as hurdles to the
voter for minorities and low-income communities. Although the findings
have been disputed, several studies have demonstrated that these populations
were "especially prone to not having proper identification." 2 1 There has been
a great deal of litigation over challenges to these laws since 2013, but the
combined effect of the Court's decision in Crawford v. Marion County
Elections Board2 2 and the uncertain standard for bringing a vote denial claim
under the remaining VRA provisions post-Shelby has led to inconsistent and
unsatisfactory judicial results for those concerned about voter access. 23 In
the wake of the 2016 election and the countless allegations of voter fraud,
election rigging, and vote denial, it is imperative to articulate a new, clear,
and workable judicial standard to evaluate voting access in future elections.
Through an analysis of the current judicial atmosphere and remaining
legal methodologies pertaining to protecting the right to vote, this Note
proposes a new workable standard for evaluating claims of vote denial and
voter suppression under section 2 of the VRA. Since the obstacles to
successfully challenging voter ID laws under an equal protection analysis are
unlikely to be overcome in the short term,24 this Note demonstrates that the
VRA still provides the best available legal strategy for voting rights
advocates. Although the majority of section 2 jurisprudence addresses issues

21. Zoltan Hajnal et al., Voter IdentificationLaws and the Suppression ofAfinority Votes, 79
J. OF AM. POL. 363, 363-65 (April 2017) [hereinafter Voter IdentificationLaws and the Suppression
ofAfinority Votes] (citingU.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-634, ISSUES RELATED
TO STATE VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAWS (2014) and BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., CITIZENS
WITHOUT PROOF: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS' POSSESSION OF DOCUMENTARY PROOF OF
CITIZENSHIP AND PHOTO IDENTIFICATION (2006)).

22. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Elections Bd, 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (finding that a state's interest
in preventing in-person voter fraud, even when there is little to no evidence of its occurrence within
the State, is sufficient rationale to overcome the burdens placed on voters by mandating they obtain
State-issued photo identification).
23. Compare Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808 (S.D.
Ohio), aff'd, 768 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2014), stay granted, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014), vacated sub nom.
Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct.
1, 2014), and League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 240 (4th Cir.
2014), and Veasey v. Perry, No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 WL 5090258 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2014); with
Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014) and Lee v.
Va. State Bd. of Elections, 843 F.3d 592 (4th Cir. Dec. 13, 2016).
24.

See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 194-95.
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of vote dilution rather than vote denial,25 this Note nonetheless demonstrates
that it can be effectively applied to all forms of voter disenfranchisement.
This Note surveys recent court decisions regarding voter ID and vote denial
claims brought under section 2,26 and concludes that federal courts have
begun to coalesce around a standard for their analysis. To address several
remaining issues that the judicially agreed upon aspects of this test leave
unresolved, this Note reviews two proposals put forward in law review
publications for additional suggestions. Finally, by combining the agreed
upon aspects of the test with a method for introducing evidence of implicit
bias and demonstrating the state's interest in regulating voting, this Note
offers a new judicial standard that provides both sides of the voter ID debate
an equal opportunity to be heard.

I. Challenges to Voter ID Laws Under the Equal Protection
Clause Are Not Currently Viable
The only time the United States Supreme Court has considered a
challenge to a voter ID law was in the 2008 case of Crawford v. Marion
County Elections Board.27 Although the claim was not brought under a
provision of the Voting Rights Act and the case itself produced a plurality
opinion, a majority of Justices did agree on a legal standard for vote denial
claims under the Equal Protection Clause.28 Justice Stevens' opinion, which
was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, applied a
"balancing test" derived from Anderson v. Celebrezze29 and Burdick v.
Takushi3 0 to uphold Indiana's voter ID law. 3 1 This "balancing standard" was

25. Prior to Shelby, the majority of cases brought under section 2 of the VRA addressed vote
dilution rather than vote denial. In 1982, Congress even specifically amended section 2 to address
the "broad array of dilution schemes" that had been "employed to cancel the impact of the . . black
vote." S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 6 (1982).
26. See Jaime Fuller, How has Voting Changed Since Shelby County v. Holder?, WASH.
POST (July 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/07/07/how-hasvoting-changed-since-shelby-county-v-holder/.
27. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 181 (2008).
28. Id. at 210-11 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that the lead opinion does not disavow the
basic principles of a "sliding scale balancing analysis" supported by Justice Souter's dissent, but
that "it does not insist enough on the hard facts that [the] standard of review demands); see Daniel
P. Tokaji,Applying Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 439, 470 (2015)
(pointing out that Justice Souter and Justice Steven applied the same balancing test, differing only
in the way they applied that standard to the facts).
29. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
30. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
31. Crawford, 533 U.S. at 190 (lead opinion of Stevens, J.) (quoting Andersonv. Celebrezze,
460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) and Burdickv. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).
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also embraced by Justice Souter, who authored a dissent joined by Justice
Ginsburg that likewise balanced the burdens on voting against the benefits
of the law to the state.32 The key difference between Justice Stevens and
Justice Souter was their evaluation of the weight of the law's burdens and
benefits. Justice Souter applied the same standard as the lead opinion, yet
he found the burdens on voting heavier and the state's justifications less
significant than Justice Stevens.33 Since Justice Breyer wrote a solitary
dissent that also balanced the burdens on voting against the benefits of the
law, 34 six Justices in Crawford agreed that a balancing standard should
govern equal protection challenges to burdens on electoral participation.35
Under the Anderson-Burdick balancing test applied in Crawford, a
court evaluating a vote denial claim brought under the Equal Protection
Clause must weigh the "character and magnitude" of the burden on voting, 3 6
"however slight [it] may appear"37 against the "precise interest put forward
by the State as justifications for the burden." 38 When the burden on voting
is found to be "severe," then strict scrutiny will apply. 3 9 Lesser burdens
require a less weighty interest, and along with even "reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions," 0 will be balanced against the state's
"important regulatory interests." 4 Since the right to vote itself is anchored
in "the protected right . . . to participate in state elections on an equal basis
with other qualified voters whenever the State has adopted an elective
process for determining who will represent any segment of the State's
population," 4 2 the Equal Protection Clause and thus the Anderson-Burdick
balancing test is invoked even in the case of nondiscriminatory restrictions
on the right to vote.43

32. See id. at 209-11 (Souter, J., dissenting).
33. See Crawford, 533 U.S. at 190; see also Tokaji, supra note 28.
34. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 237 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
35. See Tokaji, supra note 28.
36. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quotingAnderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
37. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191.
38. Id. at 190 (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434); Tokaji, supra note 28, at 470.
39. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 190.
40. Id. (quotingBurdick, 504 U.S. at 434).
41. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
42. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36, n.78 (1973).
43. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) ("this Court has made clear that a
citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other
citizens in the jurisdiction"); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970) (before the right to vote
can be restricted, the purpose of the restrictions and the asserted overriding interests served by it
must meet close constitutional scrutiny); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665
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The Crawford lead opinion's finding that Indiana had a legitimate state
particularly given the
interest in preventing in-person voter fraud,
recognition that the "record contains no evidence of any such fraud actually
occurring in Indiana at any time in its history,"4 5 is of great import to future
challenges to voter ID laws. In justifying Indiana's interest in preventing
in-person voter fraud, Justice Stevens cited, "flagrant examples of [in person
voter] fraud in other parts of the country . . . documented throughout this
Nation's history" and "occasional examples" that "have surfaced in recent
years"47 as proof that "not only is the risk of voter fraud real" but that it could
also "affect the outcome of a close election." 4 " The use of evidence from
other states to justify an Indiana election law is questionable given the
Court's previous assertion that vote denial claims require an "intensely local
appraisal" 49 of the challenged practices. If, arguendo, the requirement of an
"intensely local appraisal" applies to vote denial claims brought under the
Equal Protection Clause as well as claims brought under section 2 of the
VRA, it would render Stevens' argument tenuous at best. His argument
becomes even more attenuated when viewed in light of the accompanying
footnote 11 (which cites "infamous examples" of in-person voter
impersonation "in the New York City elections of the late 19th century" as
support)o and footnote 12 (which, when read in its entirety, claims that there
are "scattered instances of in-person voter fraud" but cites only one
confirmed individual of committing it)." Despite the weak evidence and its
even weaker link to a voter ID law in Indiana, the current Court is unlikely
to be persuaded to overrule the decision anytime soon. Since the AndersonBurdick test allows non-severe burdens on voting to be justified by less
important state regulatory interests, the Crawford Court's assignment of
weight to the prevention of non-occurring voter fraud is virtually crippling

(1966) ("once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are
inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
44. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 194-95.
45. Id. at 194.
46. See Jani Nelson, The CausalContext ofDisparate Vote Denial, 54 B.C. L. REv. 579, 638,
n.289 (2013).
47. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 195.
48. Id. at 196.
49. Thornburgv. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 78 (1986) (quoting White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755,
769 (1973)) (holding, in part, that vote dilution claims brought under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act
require an "intensely local appraisal" of context, including nine factors listed in a Senate Report
regarding the 1982 Amendments to the VRA); see Tokaji, supra note 28, at 446.
50.
51.

Crawford, 553 U.S. 195, n.11.
Id. at n.12.
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to equal protection challenges to voter ID laws. It is thus highly doubtful
that Crawford can be overturned and any challenge to a voter ID law could
be successful under the Equal Protection Clause in the near future.

II. The Voting Rights Act Still Provides the Best Protection for
Voters
Due to the obstacles created by the Crawford decision, lawyers and
activists desiring to challenge voter ID laws for illegally burdening or
denying the right to vote turned their focus from the Equal Protection Clause
to the Voting Rights Act. Prior to 2013, section 5 of the VRA had required
all changes to voting standards, practices, or procedures in states and
political subdivisions of a state which met the criteria provided by section
4(b) 52 to be submitted for federal review and preclearance prior to
implementation. 53 The federal review took place before a three-judge panel
or through an administrative submission to the U.S. Attorney General, and
any proposed changes to election procedure that were proven to have the
purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race
or color would be denied preclearance.
These preclearance proceedings
were successfully used to challenge proposed voter ID laws in Texas,
Florida, South Carolina, and New Hampshire. 5
The Supreme Court's
decision in Shelby County v. Holder,56 however, effectively put an end to this
strategy.
The ability to use section 5 has always been limited to claims arising
within States and "political subdivisions" in which "the prohibitions set forth
in section 4(a) are in effect." 5 7 Since section 4(a) only applies to States
brought under its provisions by the formula in section 4(b),5 " it is clear that
section 5 has always been intimately linked to the coverage formula in
section 4(b). Thus, when the Shelby Court ruled that section 4(b) of the VRA

52. The coverage formula of § 4(b) of the VRA, the provision found unconstitutional by
Shelby County v. Holder, provided that States or "political subdivision of a State" would be brought
under the federal oversight of § 5 if "the Director of the Census determines that less than 50 per
centum of the citizens of voting age were registered on November 1, 1972, or that less than 50 per
centum of such persons voted in the Presidential election of November 1972." 52 U.S.C. §
10303(b) (2016).
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

VotingRights Act of 1965, § 5; 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2016).
See Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 4(a); 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a) (2016).
Nelson, supra note 46, at n.32.
Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
VotingRights Actof 1965, § 5; 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2016).
VotingRights Actof 1965 § 4(a); 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a) (2016).

Winter 2018]

REVIVING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

381

was unconstitutional, it also effectively nullified section 5 and the ability to
challenge laws and practices that would burden the right to vote using
preclearance procedures. As a direct result, vote denial jurisprudence under
the VRA, and therefore also the legal strategy for challenging voter ID laws,
59
was completely altered yet again.
After the Shelby decision, the focus of vote denial claims was forced to
shift to the protection provided by section 2 of the VRA. 6 0 This has presented
a host of new obstacles for the legal community. Between 1982 and 2013,
section 2 had primarily been used to challenge claims of minority vote
dilution. 6 ' More specifically, there were a total of three hundred twenty-two
lawsuits involving section 2 claims during that period for which rulings are
available, and two hundred sixty-six of those can be safely characterized as
vote dilution rather than vote denial cases.6 2 As a result, the primary
precedents currently guiding courts in their evaluation of section 2 vote
denial claims are the methods used to assess vote dilution claims. The
Supreme Court has yet to consider a case involving a section 2 vote denial
claim, and thus there is currently no universal standard that lower courts must
follow. Developing suggestions for a universal standard for section 2 vote
denial claims has become the subject of many academic writings, and any

59. See Jessica Cassella, Using Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to Fight Voter Suppression
TacticsAfter Shelby County v. Holder Without a New Section 4(b) Formula, 42 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 161, 162 (2014).
60. Tokaji, supra note 28, at 440. Section two of the VRA provides that "no voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, orprocedure shall be imposed or applied
by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of
the guarantees set forth [for language minorities]." A violation is "established if, based on the
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election
in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of
citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members
of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."
52 U.S.C. 10301.
61. Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Aeets the Voting Rights
Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 708 (2006) [hereinafter The New Vote Denial].
62. Id. at 708-09 (citing Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discriminationin Voting: Judicial
Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643
(2006)). Vote dilution refers to the use of practices, such as redistricting, that minimize the voting
strength of racial or other minorities. As described by the Supreme Court, the essence of a vote
dilution claim "is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and
historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters
to elect their preferred representatives." Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986). Vote denial
is the practice of outright denying an individual the right to vote through the use of a test, device,
or procedural mechanism, such as literacy tests.
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attempt to make a further suggestion on the topic must begin with an
understanding of the current state of the section 2 standard.
A. Section Two Jurisprudence Applies to All Forms of Voting
Discrimination
The original version of section 2 of the VRA stated that "no voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure
shall be imposed or applied . .. to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of
the United States to vote on account of race or color." 63 This text was
modeled directly after the language of the Fifteenth Amendment, which
provides that "[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude. 6 4 Despite its plurality opinion in
City of Mobile v. Bolden, a majority of the Supreme Court held that the
protection offered by the Constitution, and therefore section 2,6 reached
"only intentional race discrimination."6 7 Accordingly, to succeed in a
section 2 claim against a voting law or procedure after Bolden, a plaintiff
was required to prove that it was enacted or maintained to intentionally
discriminate against a racial classification.
In a direct response to the Court's decision in Bolden, Congress
amended the language of section 2 to overrule the intent requirement.6 " In
the 1982 Amendments to the VRA, Congress changed section 2 to allow
plaintiffs to "establish a violation of the section if the evidence established
that, in the context of the 'totality of the circumstance of the local electoral
process,' the standard, practice or procedure . . . had the result of denying a
racial or language minority an equal opportunity to participate in the political
,,69
process.
Section 2(a) of the VRA currently reads:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice,
or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political

63. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2; 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2016).
64. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
65. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
66. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 560-61 ("It is apparent that the language of § 2 no more than
elaborates upon that of the Fifteenth Amendment, and . . . was intended to have an effect no
different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself.").
67.
68.

Tokaji, supra note 28, at 443.
Tokaji, supra note 28, at 443.

69.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIvIL RIGHTS DIV., SECTION 4 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT,

https://www.justice.gov/crt/section-2-voting-rights-act (Dec. 15, 2016); see Cassella, supra note
59, at 162.
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subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of
the right of any citizens of the United States to vote on account of race
or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section
10303(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b).70
While the text of the amended VRA did not list the factors that should
be considered under section 2(b)'s "totality of the circumstances" language,
a Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the history of the amendments listed
nine factors ("Senate Factors") for courts to consider.
These factors, later
used and adopted by the Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles,72 include:
1.

2.
3.

4.

5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

The history of voting-related discrimination in the
State or political subdivision that touched the right of
the members of the minority group to register, to vote,
or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
The extent to which voting in the elections of the state
or political subdivision is racially polarized;
The extent to which the state or political subdivision
has used unusually large election districts, majority
vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or
other voting practices or procedures that may enhance
the opportunity for discrimination against the
minority group;
If there is a candidate slating process, whether the
members of the minority group have been denied
access to that process;
The extent to which members of the minority group in
the state or political subdivision bear the effects of
discrimination
in such areas as education,
employment and health, which hinder their ability to
participate effectively in the political process;
Whether political campaigns have been characterized
by overt or subtle racial appeals;
The extent to which members of the minority group
have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction;
Whether political campaigns have been characterized
by overt or subtle racial appeals;
Whether the policy underlying the state or political
subdivision's use of such voting qualification,

70. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 2(a); 52 U.S.C.
was previously known as VRA § 4(f)(2).
71.
72.

§ 10301(a)

S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 27 (1982).
Thornburgv. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44-45 (1986).

(2017). Note that

§ 10303(f)(2)
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or

The Senate Report made clear that there should be "no requirement that
any particular number of factors be proved, or that a majority of them point
one way or the other." 7 4 The list was not meant to be either comprehensive
or exclusive, and the "ultimate test" for a section 2 violation was stated to
be "whether, in the particular situation, the [challenged] practice operated to
deny the minority plaintiff[s] an equal opportunity to participate and to elect
candidates of their choice." 7 6
The majority's opinion in Gingles provides important and enlightening
tools for conceptualizing an analytic framework for section 2 vote denial
claims.
In adopting the Senate Factors as part of their analysis of vote
dilution claims, the Gingles majority emphasized that any complaint brought
under section 2 demanded an "intensely local appraisal" of the challenged
practices. 8 Justice Brennan's majority opinion also articulated the "core
principle" 79 that "the essence of a [section] 2 claim is that a certain electoral
law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to
cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to
elect their preferred representatives." 0 Lastly, and perhaps most important
to the development of a legal standard for evaluating section 2 vote denial
claims, this language in the Gingles opinion leaves no doubt that the Court
sees the resulting test as applying to all forms of voting discrimination, not
just vote dilution.si
B. There Has Been a Substantial Coalesce Among Federal Courts
Regarding a Section Two Vote Denial Standard
Lower courts have struggled to find a universal legal standard for
evaluating vote denial claims under section 2 in the wake of Shelby, leading

73. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982).
74. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 29 (1982).
75. Tokaji, supra note 28, at 444.
76. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 29.
77. See Nelson, supra note 46, at 595-96; see also Tokaji, supra note 28, at 446.
78. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 78 (1986) (quoting White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755,
769 (1973)); see Tokaji, supra note 28, at 446.
79.
80.
81.

Tokaji, supra note 28, at 445.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47.
Tokaji, supra note 28, at 446.
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to variation in the way the VRA has been enforced.8 2 Looking to past and
recent cases for guidance on how to apply section 2 to vote denial, the reason
for this confusion is apparent. While some courts have used a proximate
causation test, 83 others have required a showing of intentional
discrimination. 4 A majority of courts have agreed, however, on a contextual
approach that draws on the nine Senate Factors endorsed in Gingles," with
particular focus on "social historical inequalities that interact with the
challenged practice to result in the disproportionate denial of minority
votes."8 6 After a threshold showing of causation has been established with
proof that the challenged practice has a disparate impact on racial
minorities,8 7 this majority approach then proceeds to an analysis of the

Senate Factors to determine if there is sufficient interaction with social and
historical inequalities.
There are three federal courts that have recently agreed on a test for
section 2 vote denial claims, and a close reading of other lower courts (with
the exception of the Seventh Circuit) shows "substantial agreement" on the
standard that should govern section 2 vote denial claims. 8 In Ohio State
Conference of the NAACP v. Husted,9 the Sixth Circuit articulated two
elements required by section 2 to prove vote denial: (1) that the challenged
practice imposes a "discriminatory burden" on a protected class; and (2) that
the burden is "caused by or linked to "social and historical conditions" that

82. Compare Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808 (S.D.
Ohio), aff'd, 768 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2014), stay granted, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014), vacated sub nom.
Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct.
1, 2014), and League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 240 (4th Cir.
2014), and Veasey v. Perry, No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 WL 5090258 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2014); with
Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014) and Lee v.
Va. State Bd. of Elections, 843 F.3d 592 (4th Cir. Dec. 13, 2016).
83. See, e.g., Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586,
595 (9th Cir. 1997); Ortiz v. City of Phila., 28 F.3d 306, 321 (3d Cir. 1994).
84. See, e.g., Brownv. Detzner, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1245-49 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (requiring
proof of intentional discrimination by public actors to prevail on a § 2 denial claim); Farrakhan v.
Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990, 993-94 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
85. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28-29; see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44-45.
86. Tokaji, supra note 28, at 448 (citing Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 851 (6th Cir.
2006), vacated by 473 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc) ("most courts, however, take a contextual
approach that draws on the Senate factors . . . .").
87. Tokaji, supra note 28, at 454; see generally Stewartv. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843 (6th Cir.
2006), vacated as moot, 473 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
88. Tokaji, supra note 28, at 445.
89. Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd,
768 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2014), stay granted, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014), vacated sub nom. Ohio State
Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014).
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have or currently produce discrimination against members of the protected
class. 90 For the first element, the court evaluated how minorities fared
against a new burden as "compared to other groups of voters" 9' rather than
as compared to past practices (as had been required under section 5). This
decision and test was subsequently followed by the Fourth Circuit and a
federal district court in Texas. 9 2 Additionally, in Frank v. Walker,93 the
analysis adopted by the district court was functionally similar to that of the
Fourth and Sixth Circuits despite the fact that the two-part test was not
expressly adopted. 9 4 However, the Seventh Circuit later reversed the Frank
v. Walker district court opinion, expressing skepticism regarding the second
part of the test adopted from the Fourth and Sixth Circuits (that the burden
must be linked to 'social and historical conditions' that have or currently
'produce discrimination') because discrimination "by the defendants" 9 5 had
not been required. 96 Despite the potential additional hurdles this Seventh
Circuit decision poses for future claims, it can still be said that four separate
federal courts have used the same test to analyze a section 2 vote denial claim.
Notwithstanding this relative coalescing of standards, there remain two
key areas of disagreement among courts in their pre-2014 decisions that have
yet to be resolved: (1) the meaning of causation in a section 2 vote denial
claim, including whether it requires a showing of racially discriminatory
intent from the defendants; 97 and (2) what social-historical conditions must
be shown. 98 Concerning to the first issue, there appears to be a general
consensus that some showing of causation is required to prevail on a section
2 claim, however there has been disagreement over what needs to be shown
to satisfy it. 9 9 Some courts have understood it to require a Washington v.
Davis level of "discriminatory intent," 0 0 while others have simply required

90. Husted, 768 F.3d at 554 (quoting Thornburgv. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986)).
91. Husted, 768 F.3d at 556.
92. See League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 240 (4th Cir.
2014); Veasey v. Perry, No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 WL 5090258 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2014).
93. Frankv. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Wis. 2014).
94. See Tokaji, supra note 28, at 460.
95. Frank, 768 F.3d at 755 (emphasis added).
96. Tokaji, supra note 28, at 461.
97. Tokaji, supra note 28, at 451.
98. Tokaji, supra note 28, at 448.
99. Tokaji, supra note 28, at 451.
100. See generally Washingtonv. Davis, 426 U.S. 239, 241 (1976); see also Brownv. Detzner,
895 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1244 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (stating explicitly that section 2 plaintiffs must show
intentional discrimination either by public officials or private actors in the form of "racial bias in
the community"); Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of the City Comm'rs Voter Registration Div., 28
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that the challenged practice be a "but-for cause of a disproportionate
burden"' 0 ' on minority voters.102 In terms of the kind of social-historical
conditions that must be demonstrated, most courts rely on the Senate Factors
for guidance.1 03 Absent a decision from the Supreme Court regarding the
standard for causation in a section 2 claim, however, it is unclear how helpful
evidence of the Senate Factors will be.' 0 4 Both of these issues will have to
be addressed and resolved in any proposal for a universal section 2 vote
denial standard.

III. Approaches to Creating a Better Legal Standard
The main obstacle to creating a workable standard for vote denial
claims is reconciling the Supreme Court's requirement that the claim be
proven with something more than disparate impact with section 2's
purposeful exclusion of an intent requirement.1o' There have been some
indications from the Court that, absent a valid defense on behalf of State
actors,' 0 6 they may view remedial efforts based solely on a racially disparate
impact as the equivalent of reverse racial discrimination and thus a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. 0 7 Although the Court ultimately declined to

F.3d 306, 312 (3rd Cir. 1994) (stating that "section 2 plaintiff must show a causal connection
between the challenged voting practice and the prohibited discriminatory result" while
simultaneously not finding evidence that African-American and Latino voters were affected by
voter purges at higher rates than white voters sufficient for showing a causal connection between
the challenged purge and registration disparities).
101. Tokaji, supra note 28, at 451.
102. See Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 406-07 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (challenge to
Arizona's voter ID law rejected primarily due to a failure to prove but-for causation); Common
Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1375 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (finding that plaintiffs had
failed to show a substantial likelihood of success in their § 2 challenge to Georgia's voter ID law
because, although they produced evidence of racial disparities in wealth and access to vehicles,
they had not shown evidence of racial disparities in the possession of driver's licenses or other
forms of photo ID).
103. Tokaji, supra note 28, at 454.
104. Tokaji, supra note 28, at 455 ('I]s it enough to demonstrate underlying inequalities (in
socioeconomic status, for example) that correlate with race? Or are these 'soft purpose' factors
designed to get at intentional discrimination on the part of either public or private actors?").
105. Nelson, supra note 46, at 612.
106. Cf Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 563 (2009) (explaining that because the City of
New Haven's hearings regarding the racially disproportionate exam results of a test to become a
firefighter produced no strong evidence of a disparate-impact violation under Title VII, the City
was not entitled to throw out those results based solely on the racial disparity).
107. Cf id. ("[B]efore an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted
purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a
strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take
the race-conscious, discriminatory action.").
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address this constitutional question, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in
Ricci v. DeStefanoos clearly indicated that the Court saw a tension between
the constitution and statutes containing disparate impact provisions.' 09 The
Court had previously issued a similar, although far less explicit, warning
regarding the VRA."o This trajectory suggests "an outlook that laws that
prohibit disparate impact 'are constitutional only if those impacts can be
shown to reflect a racially-discriminatory purpose.""" At a minimum,
however, Ricci suggests that the Court will narrowly construe statutory
disparate impact provisions to avoid constitutional conflicts unless there is a
sufficient causal link between the challenged practice and the
disproportionate harm.
The tension between the Equal Protection Clause and a pure disparate
impact standard demands a careful investigation into what, other than an
intent to discriminate based on race, can prove that disparate vote denial is
"on account of race" as is required by the language of section 2.112 The fifth
Senate Factor is particularly instructive in this regard, suggesting an
examination of the extent to which members of the minority group "bear the
effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment, and health,
which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political
process.""1 This factor recognizes the important reality that a neutral voting
practice or procedure can still produce a discriminatory result in electoral
participation when it exists in a particular context of racial inequality and
implicit bias." 4

In addition to surmounting the obstacle of an unclear causation standard
presented by an apparent constitutional need for more than evidence of
disparate impact and section 2's purposeful exclusion of an intent

108.
109.

Ricci, 557 U.S. 557.
Id. at 593.

110. Nelson, supra note 46, at 612 (citing Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47 (stating that multimember
districts and at-large elections do not per se violate minority voters' rights, it must still be proven
that the electoral structure at issue operates to minimize or cancel out their ability to elect their
preferred candidates)).
111.

Nelson, supra note 46, at 612 (citing Rick Pildes, How Ricci WillAffect the Voting Rights

Act, BALKINIZATION (June 29, 2009), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/06/how-ricci-will-affectvoting-rights-act.html) ("[I]t would be unconstitutional for Congress to make disparate impacts
illegal if they cannot be shown to reflect an underlying discriminatory purpose. That is, impact can
be looked to . .. as evidence of purpose..

..

But impact alone cannot be a constitutional basis for

making a state law/practice illegal.").
112. Nelson, supra note 46, at 612.
113. S. REP.No. 97-417, at29 (1981-1982); see Thornburgv. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986).
114. Nelson, supra note 46, at 618.
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requirement, Daniel Tokaji has convincingly argued that a good section 2
vote denial test should: (1) be faithful to the VRA's text and congressional
intent; (2) offer an administrable doctrinal structure; (3) not be too complex
or vague; (4) make room for the State to offer justifications for its voting
restrictions as the Court indicated it should be allowed to do in Crawford;"'
and (5) keep within the boundaries of Congress' enforcement powers.
Any proposed test for a section 2 vote denial claim should, however, be
critiqued based on the other four standards.
A. Current Proposals for a Section Two Vote Denial Standard Are
Insufficient
There have been several different types of tests for section 2 vote denial
claims put forth in scholarly journals. The first type might be labeled as
burden-shifting, and suggests that the plaintiff should have the "initial
burden of showing both that the challenged practice results in the
disproportionate denial of minority votes, and that the disparate impact is
traceable to the challenged practice's interaction with social and historical
conditions."" 7 The second is the causation and impact-plus test, which
recommends a "sort of under-the-table balancing" of the State's interest in
the challenged practice "against its vote denying impact" that "allow[s]

115. See generally Crawford v. Marion Cty. Elections Bd, 553 U.S. 181, 189-91 (2008)
(articulating the Anderson-Burdick balancing test).
116. Tokaji, supra note 28, at 467-68. There are many arguments both supporting and
challenging the constitutionality of the VRA that have been extensively written about and will not
be reviewed or repeated here. See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Race, Region, and Vote Choice
in the 2008 Election: Implicationsfor the Future ofthe Voting RightsAct, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1385,
1393 (2010); Warren M. Christopher, The Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 18
STAN. L. REV. 1, 15 (1965); Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Understandingthe ParadoxicalCase of the
Voting Rights Act, 36 FLA, ST. U. L. REV. 697, 701 (2009); Michael Halberstam, The Myth of
"Conquered Provinces": Probing the Extent of the VRA s Encroachment on State and Local
Autonomy, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 923, 927 (2011); Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional
Power to Extend and Amend the Voting Rights Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2007); Pamela S.
Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies After Flores, 39
WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 731-41 (1998); Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation:
CongressionalPower to Enforce the Fourteenth and FifteenthAmendments in the Rehnquist and
Waite Courts, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2341, 2361 (2003); Luke P. McLoughlin, Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act and City of Boerne: The Continuity, Proximity, and Trajectory of Vote-Dilution
Standards, 31 VT. L. REV. 39, 47-48 (2006); Michael J. Pitts, CongressionalEnforcement of
Affirmative Democracy Through Section 2 of the Voting RightsAct, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 185, 18788 (2005); Jennifer C. Presto, The 1982 Amendments to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act:
ConstitutionalityAfter City of Boerne, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 609, 614 (2004); Franita
Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty: Federalismas a Constrainton the Voting Rights Act, 65 VAND.
L. REV. 1195, 1202 (2012).
117.

Tokaji, supra note 28, at 447.
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judges to consider the justifications the government proffers for adopting or
keeping the voting practice in question.""" A third proposed test has been
called quasi-intent, and proposes that plaintiff should be "required to prove
'to a significant likelihood' that the electoral inequality is traceable to racebased decision making . . on the part of either traditional public actors (like
legislators or election officials) or by voters."" 9 The fourth test, the inverse
relation test, suggests that "the more severe the racial disparity of voting
access that results from a challenged practice, the more tenuous the
justification should be seen to be, even if that justification is asserted to have
nothing to do with race."1 2 0 The two most compelling tests, however, have
been those offered by Daniel Tokaji and Janai Nelson, the Associate
Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.
In his 2015 article Applying Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, Tokaji
proposes a three-part test for section 2 vote denial claims alleging a burden
on voting:
1.

2.

3.

Plaintiff must show that the challenged standard,
practice, or procedure causes a disproportionate
burden on members of a protected class that an
alternative standard, practice, or procedure would
avoid;
Plaintiffs must show that the disproportionate burden
is traceable to interaction of the challenged standard,
practice or procedure with 'social and historical
conditions' that have produced or currently produce
discrimination against members of the protected class;
If the plaintiffs satisfy (1) and (2), then the defendants
must show by clear and convincing evidence that the
burden on voting is outweighed by the state interests
in the challenged standard, practice, or procedure.121

118. Nelson, supra note 46, at 613-14 (quoting The New Vote Denial, supra note 61, at 722).
119. Tokaji, supra note 28, at 447 (quoting Christopher Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section
2: OfBiased Votes, UnconstitutionalElections, and Common Law Statues, 160 U. PENN. L. REV.
377, 399-403 (2012)).
120. Nelson, supra note 46, at 614 (quoting Stephen B. Pershing, The Voting RightsAct in the
InternetAge: An Equal Access Theory for Interesting Times, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1171, 1199
(2001)).
121.

Tokaji, supra note 28, at 474.
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This test is largely based on the two-step test used by the Sixth Circuit
in Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted,122 however adds a third
element.1 23

'

Tokaji's concern with giving the state the ability to justify an election
practice when it only slightly burdens voters contrasts sharply with the
primary focus of Nelson's proposed test. Concentrating on what she calls
the "theory of causal context," 2 4 Nelson suggests an analysis that does not
necessarily require direct causation, but instead "recognizes that the nexus
between the harm and the instrument is not necessarily linear" 2 5 when it
comes to explaining racially disparate impacts of election practices.
Through analyzing the environment within which a vote denial claim arises,
her causal context test seeks to legally incorporate the way "coexisting and
mutually reinforcing factors" 26 and "persistent racial inequality" outside of
an electoral context can interact with "race-neutral" election laws to cause
disparate vote denial.1 27 In a causal context analysis, an electoral practice
will be found to deny or abridge the right to vote "on account of racel28 in
violation of section 2 if it produces (1) a "statistically significant"' 2 9
disparate impact that is (2) "because of racial inequality inside or outside the
electoral arena that (3) interacts with the practice to reproduce racial
disparities within the electoral arena." 30 To succeed in a section 2 vote
denial claim under Nelson's test, plaintiffs are thus required to offer proof
that "racial inequality has permeated the electoral arena."' 3
Nelson offers compelling arguments that a contextual approach to
section 2 claims is necessary to effectively enforce the VRA and convincing
evidence that her model fits within and draws from existing precedent. She

122. See Ohio State Conf. of the NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808 (S.D. Ohio), affd,
768 F.3d 524 (6th Cir.), stay granted, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014).
123. The additional third prong, as quoted here, is different from Tokaji's original suggestion
in a 2006 article, The New Vote Denial: Where ElectionReform Meets the Voting Rights Act, where
he proposed that strict scrutiny should apply after the first two steps. Tokaji, supra note 61, at 72426. This change, he says in a later article, was done mainly "to make it easier for the state or local
jurisdiction to justify its challenged practice where the burden on participation is modest." Tokaji,
supra note 61, at 474.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Nelson, supra note 46, at 618-619.
Nelson, supra note 46, at 618.
Nelson, supra note 46, at 618.
Nelson, supra note 46, at 586.
Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 2; 52 U.S.C.
Nelson, supra note 46, at n.202.
Nelson, supra note 46, at 618.
Nelson, supra note 46, at 619.
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identifies and derives two core values of section 2 from the language of the
statute and the legislative history of its amendments: that (1) racial context
matters and (2) implicit bias counts. 3 2 Her causal context test is particularly
supported by the Senate Factors, which clearly demonstrate that Congress
intended for courts to evaluate behavior both within and outside the electoral
arena when evaluating section 2 claims.' 33 This is especially true of Senate
Factor five, which the Supreme Court called the "essence of a section 2
claim,,i 3 4 and which explicitly asks if an electoral practice "interacts with

social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities
enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives."
Additionally, since recent studies of implicit bias within the law suggest that
consideration of subconscious discrimination is indispensable to developing
an accurate understanding of modem race dynamics in America,13 5 Senate
Factor five strongly supports the idea that incorporating evidence of implicit
bias would be legally and historically consistent with past considerations of

132. Nelson, supra note 46, at 586 & n.28. Implicit bias theory can be summarized as
"discriminatory biases based on implicit attitudes or implicit stereotypes." See Anthony G.
Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. Rev.
945, 951 (2006). By its very nature, implicit bias is not perceptible by the person perpetrating it.
It operates as a subconscious influence on actions and decision making. See Charles R. Lawrence
III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with UnconsciousRacism, 39 STAN. L. REV.
317, 322 (1987) ("[A] large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced
by unconscious racial motivation." (footnote omitted)).
133. Nelson, supra note 46, at 597 (citing S. REP. NO. 97-417) (1982) (citing White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766-69 (1973); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir.
1973) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. E. Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per
curiam)).
134. Thornburgv. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986).
135. Nelson, supra note 46, at n.30 (citing IMPLICIT BIAS ACROSS THE LAW (Justin D.
Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012) (chronicling how pervasive implicit racial attitudes and
stereotypes perpetuate the continued subordination of historically disadvantaged groups in the legal
system); see generally Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 969 (2006) (investigating the possibility of using the law as a "de-biasing" tool to counter
implicit bias); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005) (applying a
social cognitive model of implicit bias to Federal Communications Commission regulations); Linda
Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law:
Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2006) (advancing a theory of
"behavioral realism" to identify discriminatory motives in Title VII disparate treatment cases);
Lawrence III, supra note 132 (evaluating the doctrine of discriminatory purpose in light of the
potential for implicit bias); Michael H. LeRoy, Do PartisanElections ofJudges Produce Unequal
Justice When CourtsReview EmploymentArbitrations?, 95 IOWAL. REV. 1569 (2010) (examining
how judicial elections impact courts' review of arbitrator rulings in employment disputes); Antony
Page & Michael J. Pitts, Poll Workers, Election Administration, and the Problem ofImplicit Bias,
15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2009) (analyzing polling places as a site for implicit bias).

Winter 2018]

REVIVING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

393

the impact of race in the electoral process.136 As will be demonstrated, there
are a total of three Senate Factors supporting this proposition.
Nelson points to three additional Senate Factors that also offer support
for using evidence of implicit bias to prove racial discrimination both within
and outside the electoral context for the purpose of establishing disparate
vote denial. 3 7 Factor two looks for racially polarized voting, which simply
means that the "race of voters correlates with the selection of a certain
candidate or candidates." 3 8 Courts have repeatedly found that evidence of
racially polarized voting reveals a subtext of racial discrimination,1 3 9 and
thus, it may point to underlying implicit or explicit bias that may be used as
contextual evidence. Senate Factor six invites evidence of "subtle racial
appeals," 4 0 which allows for the most obvious doorway for evidence of
subconscious and non-explicit bias to enter the section 2 analysis. Finally,
by inviting evidence regarding the "tenuousness" of a state's interests behind
a challenged election policy, Senate Factor nine "permits courts to attribute
a pretext for discrimination to State action when the justifications are
insufficient."' 4 ' Since this pretext "does not necessarily result from explicit
bias, but may well be the result of implicit bias that the weakness of the
State's justification reveals,"l42 it also provides a clear opportunity for
introducing evidence of implicit bias.
Using evidence of implicit bias in a causal context analysis also follows
the precedent set by Smith v. SaltRiver ProjectAgric. Improvement & Power

136. Nelson, supra note 46, at 586.
137. Nelson, supra note 46, at 622.
138. Nelson, supra note 46, at 622 (citing Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Race, Region, and Vote
Choice in the 2008 Election: Implicationsfor the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 1385, 1393 (2010) (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 62 (plurality opinion)).
139. Nelson, supra note 46, at 623 (citing League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements,
999 F.2d 831, 850 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (rejecting the district court's conclusion that to prove
racially polarized voting, "plaintiffs need only demonstrate that whites and blacks generally support
different candidates to establish legally significant white bloc voting"); Salas v. Sw. Tex. Junior
Coll. Dist., 964 F.2d 1542, 1554 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that the inquiry into racially polarized
voting "aims at determining whether it is racial voting patterns, along with other objective factors,
rather than some other set of causes, that explain the lack of electoral success of voters within the
protected class").
140. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 29 (1981-1982).
141. Nelson, supra note 46, at 624 (citing Terrazasv. Clements, 581 F. Supp. 1329, 1345 n.24
(N.D. Tex. 1984) (stating that "[t]he principal probative weight of a tenuous state policy is its
propensity to show pretext"); butsee United States v. Marengo Cty. Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1571
(11th Cir. 1984) (stating that the Senate's consideration of a non-tenuous state policy is among the
least important of the factors for determining vote dilution).
142.

Nelson, supra note 46, at 624-25.
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Dist.,143 that section 2 requires more than just statistical proof of disparate
impact. 4 4 It may, in fact, come closer to creating an evidentiary standard that
can provide a "direct causal link between state action and vote denial," without
requiring intentional discrimination, than pure statistically based evidence of
disparate impact. '45 Evidence of implicit bias also "fits squarely" 46 within the
Supreme Court's constricted reading of the VRA in important cases such as
Shaw v. Reno,'4 7 Miller v. Johnson,' 4 " and Shaw v. Hunt 49 by providing a
missing link between external factors and internal impact.
The causal context test has been criticized, however, due to Nelson's
clear assertion that evidence of purposeful discrimination is not required to
satisfy it.'5 o In his article, Applying Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, Tokaji
expresses a fear that Nelson's test may set the bar for demonstrating
causation too low for the current Court.' 5 ' On the other hand, the ability to
present evidence of implicit bias is critically important to developing a fair
legal standard for evaluating claims of vote denial due to a voter ID law. As
demonstrated by a comprehensive report published by the Government
Accountability Office, the well documented decreases in voter turnout
attributable to implementation of voter ID laws are sharper among black
voters than among whites.1 5 2 In an even more recent and much more

143. See, e.g., Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586,
595 (9th Cir. 1997); Irby v. Va. Suite Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (4th Cir. 1989).
144. Cf Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 585 (2009).
145. Id. at 625.
146. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 626.
147. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) (holding that the complaint's allegation that a
redistricting plan was so extremely irregular on its face that it could only rationally be viewed as
an effort to separate races for purposes of voting was a sufficient claim upon which relief could be
granted).
148. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 919 (1995) (stating that, compliance with traditional
districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions cannot
suffice to refute claims of racial gerrymandering when those factors were subordinated to racial
objectives) (citations omitted).
149. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 912 (1996) (holding that state objectives other than race can
be sufficient to overcome a claim that a redistricting plan fails to maximize minority
representation).
150. Nelson, supra note 46, at 633.
151. Tokaji, supra note 28, at 467.
152. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-634, ELECTIONS: ISSUES RELATED
TO STATE VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAWS 26, 48, 51-53 (Sept. 2014) (finding that: (1) turnout
decreases in Kansas and Tennessee beyond decreases in the compared states were attributable to
changes in the two states' voter ID requirements; (2) the reduced voter turnout was sharper among
people aged 18-23 than among those aged 44-53; (3) studies finding that blacks have a lower rate
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comprehensive academic study, a significant drop in minority participation
was consistently found when and where so-called "strict ID laws" are
implemented.' 53 Due to the importance of implicit bias in voter ID
considerations evidenced by this research, it seems critical that elements of
Nelson's causal context test be incorporated into whatever test is eventually
adopted as a universal standard for section 2 claims.
B. A Proper Standard for Evaluating Section Two Vote Denial Claims
Should Incorporate Both Evidence of Implicit Bias and Consideration
of State Interests
Any realistic proposed test for section 2 vote denial claims will need to
incorporate the two-step test articulated by the Sixth Circuit in Ohio State
Conference ofNAACP v. Husted"'4 that was followed by other federal courts.
Additionally, since the current shape and direction of the Supreme Court
suggests a resurgence in state sovereignty, it would also be prudent to allow
state interests to play a prominent role in the analysis. The three-step test
proposed by Tokaji, which accomplishes both of these goals, can thus serve
as a workable template for a new test designed to also incorporate elements
of Nelson's causal context theory.
In the first step of Tokaji's three-step test, the plaintiff "must show that
the challenged standard, practice, or procedure causes a disproportionate
burden on members of a protected class that an alternative standard, practice,
or procedure would avoid."" The first part of this step falls in line with
Nelson's threshold requirement that section 2 plaintiffs be able to
demonstrate that the challenged practice or procedure has a "statistically
significant"' 6 disparate impact. Tokaji's test then takes this slightly further
by also inquiring as to whether there is an alternative practice that could
avoid the disparate impact. This may be an important aspect of any section
2 vote denial claim regarding voter ID requirements, particularly in light of
of ID ownership than whites are reliable; and (4) reduced voter turnout among black voters was
between two and four percent greater than among white voters in the studied states).
153. See generally Voter Identification Laws and the Suppression ofMinority Votes, supra
note 21; Zoltan L. Hajnal, et al., Do Voter IdentificationLaws Suppress Minority Voting? Yes. We
Did the Research., WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2017) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2017/02/15/do-voter-identification-laws-suppress-minority-voting-yes-we-did-the-resear
ch/?utm term=.d0429206d6a3. States with "strict voter ID laws" are defined as states where
residents cannot vote without presenting valid identification during or after the voting process.
154. Ohio State Conf. of the NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 768
F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2014), stay granted, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014), vacated sub nom; Ohio State
Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014).
155.
156.

Tokaji, supra note 28, at 474.
Nelson, supra note 46, at n.202.
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the proven history that some state statutes were very specifically crafted in
regard to types of ID that would be accepted at the polls. 5 7 By requiring that
no alternative standard, practice, or procedure would avoid a disparate
impact, this test will also allow for any pertinent demonstration of specifics
regarding the types of IDs that were chosen as acceptable.
The second step of Tokaji's test demonstrates where Nelson's causal
context approach can best be incorporated. In Tokaji's second prong, the
plaintiff "must show that the disproportionate burden is traceable to
interaction of the challenged standard, practice, or procedure with 'social and
historical conditions' that have produced or currently produce discrimination
against members of the protected class."' 5" This is remarkably similar to
Nelson's causal context approach, which asks for a showing that the
disparate impact of a law or practice is "because of racial inequality inside
or outside the electoral arena" that "interacts with the practice to reproduce
racial disparities within the electoral arena."1 59 In fact, Tokaji agrees with
Nelson that the Senate Factors "are mainly targeted at rooting out racial
bias . . . that might infect the electoral process," and that racial polarization
is relevant to a vote denial inquiry because it may suggest "a motivation for
the state to limit a racially defined group's voting opportunities.", 6 0 He
further agrees that Senate Factor five's investigation into whether racial
minorities "bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education,
employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively
in the political process" " is especially relevant and of "special importance"
to vote denial claims. 162
As a result of this substantial agreement and the compelling necessity
to create a standard under which evidence of implicit bias may be introduced,
some modification of Tokaji's second step to incorporate language from
Nelson's suggested test will be necessary. This could be accomplished any
number of ways, but one may be as follows: "Plaintiffs must show that the
disparate burden created by the challenged standard, practice or procedure is
traceable to 'social and historical conditions' inside or outside the electoral

157. North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 216 (4th Cir.
2016) (citing 2016 WL 1650774 at *142; J.A. 3653, 2115, 2291-92).
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Tokaji, supra note 28, at 474.
Nelson, supra note 46, at 618.
Tokaji, supra note 28, at 481.
S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 29 (1981-1982).
Tokaji, supra note 28, at 481-82.
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arena that interact with the practice to reproduce disproportionate burdens
inside the electoral arena."1 6 3
This proposed second step incorporates language from both Tokaji and
Nelson's tests, stressing that the disparate/disproportionate burden may
largely be the result of factors outside the electoral arena and thereby provide
a more explicitly welcoming legal environment for evidence of implicit bias
and wider contextual factors.
By altering the second step of the analysis in this manner, voting rights
advocates will see no harm in including Tokaji's proposed third step. This
would allow the State, once steps one and two are satisfied by the plaintiff(s),
to have an opportunity to "show by clear and convincing evidence that the
burden on voting is outweighed by the state interests in the challenged
standard, practice or procedure." 6 In fact, this would help alleviate any
concern that the test sets the bar for demonstrating causation too low for the
current Court. 6 5

Put together, the proposed standard which combines Tokaji and
Nelson's proposals might read as follows:
1.

2.

3.

Plaintiff must show that the challenged standard,
practice, or procedure causes a statistically significant
disparate burden on members of a protected class that
an alternative standard, practice, or procedure would
avoid;
Plaintiffs must show that the disparate burden created
by the challenged standard, practice or procedure is
traceable to 'social and historical conditions' inside or
outside the electoral arena that interact with the
practice to reproduce disproportionate burdens within
the electoral arena;
If the plaintiffs satisfy (1) and (2), then the defendants
must show by clear and convincing evidence that the
burden on voting is outweighed by the state interests
in the challenged standard, practice, or procedure.
IV. Consequences of Voter ID Laws

The loss of section five preclearance requirements and subsequent
failure to adopt an adequate standard for evaluating vote denial claims under
section 2 has had an undeniable impact on recent American elections.

163.
164.
165.

See Tokaji, supra note 28, at 474; see also Nelson, supra note 46, at 618.
Tokaji, supra note 28, at 474.
See Tokaji, supra note 28, at 467.
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Immediately after the Shelby decision in 2013, many states previously
subject to section 5 preclearance requirements went forward with
implementing proposed changes. Most notably for the 2016 election, both
Florida and North Carolina proceeded with significant changes to their
election laws and voter registration rolls.166 The failure to adopt a standard
to adequately protect voters prior to the implementation of North Carolina's
strict new voter ID requirements, elimination of same-day voter registration,
shortening of the early voting period by seven days, and new specification
that ballots cast at the wrong polling station would be thrown away, led to
allegations of wide-spread voter suppression and denial. 67 In Florida, the
State resumed plans to remove non-citizens from voter registration rolls
using the federal Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements ("SAVE")
database. 6 While this effort was found in violation of the National Voter
Registration Act well in advance of the 2016 election,1 6 9 there were still
enough problems with the State's voter rolls that a federal judge had to
intervene in late October of 2016.170 Both of these states were ultimately
won by very slim margins, 171 meaning that even seemingly minor vote denial
potentially had a large impact.
While many studies have been produced to demonstrate the potential
for voter ID laws to have a disproportionate impact on minority voters, only
recently has election data been available to definitively assess their impact. 172
The first comprehensive study of voter ID laws to use a large sample of
validated voting data from multiple elections now unequivocally

166. See Lopez, supra note 20.
167. See Jason Mast & Benjamin Din, In North Carolina,A Battle Over Voter Suppression,
US NEWS (Oct. 30, 2016), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2016-10-30/innorth-carolina-a-battle-over-voter-suppression; Pete Williams, Judge Says North CarolinaIllegally
Purged Voter Lists, NBC NEWS (Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2016election-day/judge-says-north-carolina-illegally-purged-voter-lists-n67743 1.
168.

See Ashley Lopez, FloridaSecretary ofState PreparesNew Voter Purge, FLORIDA CTR.

FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Aug. 6, 2013), http://fcir.org/2013/08/06/rick-scott-voter-purge/.

169. See Eric Lach,Appeals CourtFinds Florida's2012 Voter Purge Broke the Law, TALKING
POINTS MEMO (Apr. 1, 2014), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/muckraker/florida-voter-purgeappeals-ruling.
170. See Zachary Roth, Election 2016: Tracking Reports of Voting Problems Across the
United States, NBC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2016-electionday/election-2016-tracking-reports-voting-problems-across-united-states-n673236.
171. Florida was won by only 112,911 votes, and the state of North Carolina by a mere 173,315
votes. See PresidentialElection Results: Donald J. Trump Wins, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.
nytimes.com/elections/results/president (Sept. 22, 2017).
172. See Voter IdentificationLaws and the Suppression ofAfinority Votes, supra note 21, for
examples of these previous studies.
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demonstrates a disproportionate suppression of minority votes. Using a
sample size of over three hundred thousand Americans, researchers were, for
the first time, able to analyze the participation of racial minorities both before
and after the implementation of strict ID laws.1 73 While overall turnout in
states with voter ID laws was not significantly different than in states without
these laws, a consistent and significant drop in minority participation was
found at the point when and in jurisdictions where such laws were
implemented.

74

The new study shows indisputable proof that a gap between white and
minority voter turnout, the improvement in which Chief Justice Roberts cited
in his rationale for striking down section 4(b), 17 is resurging in states with
strict voter ID laws. 76 In general elections, the study found that the average
gap between white and Latino turnout was 4.9 points in states without strict
voter ID laws. In states with strict voter ID laws, this difference grew to 13.2
points. 77 The gap between white turnout and both Asian-American and
African-American turnout also increases in this comparison, and even more
notably in primary elections. 78
Where a state has strict voter ID
requirements, the gap in turnout between white and black voters in primary
elections grows from 2.5 to 11.6. 179 This is indisputable evidence that, left
unchecked through either the judicial system or the VRA's statuary scheme,
the very progress that was used to overturn section 4(b) is now being
undercut by state implementation of voter ID laws.
Without a legislative fix to the section 4(b) formula to reinstitute
preclearance requirements for jurisdictions with a history of voter
discrimination, the ability to seek injunctive relief and immediate stays of
State action under section 2 is the sole remaining protection against the vote
denial and suppression efforts still underway. Adopting a fair and universal
judicial standard for evaluating claims under that provision, such as the one
offered by this Note, is of paramount importance to America's democratic
integrity and form of representative government.

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See Hajnal et al., supra note 153.
Hajnal et al., supra note 153.
See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
See Hajnal et al., supra note 153.
Hajnal et al., supra note 153.
Hajnal et al., supra note 153.
Hajnal et al., supra note 153.
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Conclusion
Voter ID laws are eroding the very progress that led to the Supreme
Court's decision to strike down section 4(b) of the VRA in Shelby County v.
Holder.'8 s It is clear, however, that section 2 is still a viable option for
challenging these laws and an effective legal tool for vote denial claims.
Adopting a standard for evaluating section 2 vote denial claims that
combines the two-step test of Ohio State Conference ofNAACP v. Husted,'8
a method for introducing evidence of implicit bias, and a mechanism for
demonstrating that state interests outweigh any burdens placed on voting,
offers all interested parties a fair opportunity to present their best argument.
Given the paramount importance of the right to vote in a democratic society,
and particularly one that considers itself an example for the world, it is only
appropriate to afford both sides of any vote denial claim the chance to present
the best argument they can make. The standard proposed in this Note would
not only give voters full protection from disproportionate burdens that result
from outside discriminatory factors interacting with facially neutral laws, but
it would also allow for states to work towards legitimate interests in election
integrity. In the modem environment of contested election results and
proven increases in the gap between white and minority voter participation,
this test has the potential to achieve the difficult balance of offering both
sides a full opportunity to be heard while simultaneously protecting the right
to vote during necessary election modernization efforts.

180. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2626 (2013).
181. Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808 (S.D. Ohio), affd,
768 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2014), stay granted, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014), vacated sub nom; Ohio State
Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014).

